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Kickbacks and Contradictions: The
Anti-Kickback Statute and Electronic
Health Records
ABSTRACT

The Obama Administration has made the universal adoption of
electronic health records a major policy priority, passing the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH)
Act, which creates incentives for physicians and hospitals to
computerize their medical records. This effort has been largely
successful, as evidenced by the significant increase in medical
providers who have adopted electronic health records. However, for the
President to achieve his goal of computerizing all medical records in
the United States, he will need to ensure that other federal laws do not
conflict with the incentive structure created by the HITECH Act. The
Anti-Kickback Statute has the potential to limit the effectiveness of the
HITECH Act by prohibiting hospitals from donating electronic health
record technology to physicians. In order to ensure that the entire
federal regulatory scheme incentivizes the adoption of electronic health
records, the Department of Health and Human Services should draft a
broad safe harbor that allows hospitals to donate the full cost of
purchasing, implementing, and maintaining electronic health record
technology to physicians.
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Electronic health records are an important advancement in the
medical field that, if fully implemented, have the potential to
drastically reduce health care costs and improve patient outcomes.'
Accordingly, the Obama Administration has strongly advocated for the
universal adoption of electronic health records. 2 The administration
views electronic health records as a mechanism to achieve two of its
major goals: improving the nation's infrastructure and reducing the
country's unsustainable level of health care spending. 3
In order to achieve the goal of computerizing all medical
records in the United States, the President included significant
funding for electronic health records in the stimulus package, his first
major legislative achievement after taking office.4 The funds included
in the stimulus package are designed to incentivize both physicians
and hospitals to rapidly transition to electronic health records.6
However, the complex regulatory scheme governing health care
providers in the United States may inadvertently prevent physicians
from computerizing their medical records. 6
Specifically, the
Anti-Kickback Statute may limit the ability of hospitals to help
physicians achieve this goal by prohibiting hospitals from donating
electronic health record technology to physicians. 7
In order to prevent the Anti-Kickback Statute from impeding
the adoption of electronic health records, the Department of Health

1.
See David Goldman, Obama's Big Idea: Digital Health Records, CNN MONEY (Jan.
12, 2009, 4:05 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/12/technology/stimulus health-care/.
2.
Id.
3.
See id.
4.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 4101, 4102,
123 Stat. 115, 353-72.
5.
Id.
6.
See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1985).
7.
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(y) (2014).
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and Human Services (HHS) created a regulatory safe harbor, allowing
hospitals to donate electronic health record technology to physicians.8
However, it is unclear if this safe harbor is broad enough to overcome
the obstacles created by the Anti-Kickback Statute.9
This Note examines how the Anti-Kickback Statute may
impede the adoption of electronic health records. Part I of this Note
will provide background information on the portion of the stimulus
package designed to promote the adoption of electronic health records
and will explain the broad scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 0 Part
II of this Note will analyze how the Anti-Kickback Statute may
impede the adoption of electronic health records and whether the safe
harbor established by HHS is sufficient to overcome this
impediment." Part III of this Note argues that the safe harbor for
electronic health records should be expanded. 12
I. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND THE HITECH ACT
The federal government is committed to incentivizing
physicians and hospitals to adopt electronic health records.
Computerizing the nation's health records is a major policy priority of
the Obama Administration.1 3 This commitment to the universal
adoption of electronic health records is evidenced by the President's
stimulus package, which created significant financial incentives for
physicians and hospitals to computerize their medical records.14
However, the Anti-Kickback Statute, a law designed to prevent fraud
by physicians and hospitals, may unintentionally prevent medical
providers from adopting electronic health records.' 5
A. The HITECH Act
Shortly before taking office, President Barack Obama
announced a plan to computerize all health records in the United
States by 2014.16 The President touted the ability of electronic health
records to improve health care outcomes and reduce costs,
8.
Id.
9.
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Electronic Health
Records Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,202 (Dec. 27, 2013) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
10.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act §§ 4101, 4102; Greber, 760 F.2d at 69.
11.
See Greber, 760 F.2d at 72; 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(y).
12.
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001.95 2 (y).
13.
Goldman, supra note 1.
14.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act §§ 4101, 4102.
15.
See Greber, 760 F.2d at 72.
16.
Goldman, supra note 1.
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stating: "This will cut waste, eliminate red tape, and reduce the need
to repeat expensive medical tests. It just won't save billions of dollars
and thousands of jobs-it will save lives by reducing the deadly but
preventable medical errors that pervade our health care system."1 7
The United States is well on its way to meeting this goal, due largely
to the significant investment in health information technology and
electronic health records included in the President's stimulus
package.18

The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act, which was part of the economic stimulus
package known as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009 (ARRA), was designed to promote the adoption of health
information technology (HIT) and the utilization of qualified electronic
health records (EHRs).19 Sections 4101 and 4102 of ARRA created
financial incentives for physicians and hospitals to adopt and use EHR
technology. 20 Early adopters of EHR technology received bonus
payments from the federal government in addition to their standard
Medicare payments. 21
However, after an adjustment period,
physicians and hospitals that fail to adopt and use EHR technology
will face a reduction in their level of Medicare reimbursement. 2 2
Beginning in 2011, the Federal Supplementary Medical
Insurance Trust Fund began making bonus payments, in addition to
their standard Medicare payment rates, to eligible professionals (EPs),
who were determined to be meaningful EHR users. 23 These bonus
payments reached their cap of $18,000 in 2011 and have decreased in
each subsequent year. 24 Beginning in 2015, the Medicare fee schedule
will reduce for EPs who are not meaningful EHR users. 25 These
physicians will receive only 99 percent of the rate typically paid by
Medicare in 2015, 98 percent in 2016, and 97 percent in 2017 and
subsequent years. 26

17.
Id.
18.
See HIT Policy Comm., Medicare & Medicaid EHR Incentive Programs, CENTERS
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-andGuidance/Legislation/EHRIncentiveProgramsDownloads/September2Ol4HITPCFullDeck-.pdf.
19.
42 C.F.R. §§ 412, 413, 422, 495 (2014).
20.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 4101, 4102,
123 Stat. 115, 353-72.
21.
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act § 4101(a).
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
24.
Id. § 4101(a)(o).
25.
Id. § 4101(b)(7).
Id.
26.
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The HITECH Act creates a similar incentive structure for
hospitals. 27 Beginning in 2011, hospitals determined to be meaningful
EHR users became entitled to receive bonus payments from the
Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund. 28 In some instances, bonus
payments were over $1 million in 2011, depending on the number of
Medicare patients served by the hospital. These payments were
reduced in each subsequent year. 2 9 In 2015, hospitals that have not
achieved meaningful EHR use will have their annual Medicare
payment update reduced. 30 Seventy-five percent of the payment
increase that the hospital would normally receive will be reduced by
33.3 percent in 2015, 66 percent in 2016, and 100 percent in 2017 and
subsequent years. 31
The HITECH Act also provides full federal financing to states
offering incentive payments to Medicaid providers who demonstrate
meaningful EHR use. 32 This creates more opportunities for physicians
and hospitals to receive bonus payments and further increases the
pressure to adopt EHRs.3 3
To receive incentive payments, providers must demonstrate
meaningful use of EHRs. 34 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) defined meaningful use in a 2010 final rule
implementing the HITECH Act. 35 CMS stated that the goal of the
regulation was "improving health care quality, encouraging
widespread EHR adoption, promoting innovation, and avoiding
imposing excessive or unnecessary burdens on health care
providers . . . ."3 6 CMS opted to use a phased approach to meaningful
use, giving providers time to develop and gain experience with EHR
technology. 37
To reach the initial stage of meaningful use and begin receiving
incentive payments, providers must focus on developing functional

27.
Id. § 4102.
Id. § 4102(a)(1).
28.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. § 4201(a).
33.
Id.
34.
42 C.F.R. § 495.6 (2014).
35.
Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75
Fed. Reg. 44,313, 44,321 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 422, 495).
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
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EHR technology. 38 Functionalities in EHR technology allow providers
to meet the Stage 1 meaningful use criteria. 39
The structure of the HITECH act gives physicians and
hospitals strong financial incentives to adopt EHR technology.
Significant use of EHR technology is on the rise as a result of this
incentive structure. 40 According to CMS, as of September 2014, more
than 414,000 health care providers had received bonus payments from
the EHR Incentive Program. 4 1 This represents more than half of all
medical providers eligible for bonus payments and exceeded the HHS's
goal for meaningful EHR use. 4 2

This success is due to the rapid growth in EHR use since the
passage of ARRA. 43 According to the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC), only 17 percent of physicians utilized EHRs in 2008.44 This
number rose to over 50 percent in 2012.45 Additionally, only 9 percent
of hospitals utilized EHRs in 2008.46 This number rose to over 80
percent in 2012.47
This trend led Secretary of HHS, Kathleen
Sebelius, to state that the United States had "reached a tipping point
in adoption of electronic health records." 48 Despite the Secretary's
confidence, legislative and financial impediments could prevent the
universal adoption of EHR technology.

38.
42 C.F.R. § 495.6.
39.
See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program,
75 Fed. Reg. at 44,321. Stage 1 meaningful use criteria includes:
[Ellectronically capturing health information in a structured format; using that
information to track key clinical conditions and communicating that information for
care coordination purposes (whether that information is structured or unstructured,
but in structured format whenever feasible); implementing clinical decision support
tools to facilitate disease and medication management; using EHRs to engage patients
and families and reporting clinical quality measures and public health information.
Id.
40.
See EHR Incentive Program, Summary Report September 2014, CMS (2014),
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Legislation/EHRIncentivePrograms/Downloads/
September20l4-SummaryReport.pdf.
41.
See id.
42.
Doctors and Hospitals' Use of Health IT More Than Doubles Since 2012, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (May 22, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/
05/20130522a.html (noting that HHS's goal was "for 50 percent of doctor offices and 80 percent of
eligible hospitals to have EHRs by the end of 2013").
43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
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B. The Anti-Kickback Statute
Despite the rapid growth in EHR use since the passage of
ARRA, the United States will still likely fail to meet the President's
goal of computerizing all health records by 2014.49 One potential
impediment to universal EHR adoption is the complex regulatory
structure employed by the United States to combat health care fraud
and abuse.50 One piece of this structure is the Anti-Kickback Statute,
a law designed to prevent payments to doctors in exchange for
referring patients to hospitals or other health care providers.5 1 The
US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit significantly expanded the
scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute when it decided United States v.
Greber in 1985.52 The court established the "One Purpose Test,"
holding that if one purpose of a payment was to induce future
referrals, the arrangement violated the Anti-Kickback Statute. 53
In Greber, Cardio-Med, Inc., an organization that supplies
medical technology and provides diagnostic services to physicians,
received funding from the federal health insurance program,
Medicare. 54 After Cardio-Med received payment for its services, the
company forwarded a portion of the Medicare payment to the
physician who had referred the patient to the company.55 These
payments were called interpretation fees.5 6 The CEO of Cardio-Med
stated that the company paid the physicians these interpretation fees
as reimbursement for their initial consultation services and for
explaining test results to patients.5 7
The CEO admitted that inducing referrals to Cardio-Med was
also a reason for offering interpretation fees, stating: "[If the doctor
didn't get his consulting fee, he wouldn't be using our service. So the
doctor got a consulting fee."5 8 However, the CEO claimed that he
believed the fee was legitimate because Cardio-Med and the referring
physicians shared the responsibility of explaining test results to
patients. 59

49.
50.
100-93,
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

§

Id.
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
14(a), 101 Stat. 680.
Id.
United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Third Circuit began its analysis of the case by reviewing
the text of the Anti-Kickback Statute, which states:
[W]hoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly in cash or in kind to
induce such person(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing .. . or ordering
any ... service or item for which payment may be made . . . under this title, shall be
60
guilty of a felony.

The Third Circuit also analyzed the legislative history of the
1977 Amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute.6 1 The legislative
history demonstrated that Congress was focused on "the practice of
giving 'kickbacks' to encourage the referral of work." 62 Based on this
area of focus, the court stated that the primary purpose of the statute
was to prevent the inducement of referrals. 63 Consequently, the court
found that "[e]ven if the physician performs some service for the
money received," a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute can still
occur because "the potential for unnecessary drain on the Medicare
system remains. "64
The court also stated that Congress's addition of the term
''remuneration" to the Anti-Kickback Statute further supported this
conclusion.6 5 The definition of remunerates is "to pay an equivalent
for service." 66 Therefore, the court reasoned that "[b]y adding
'remuneration' to the statute in the 1977 Amendment, Congress
sought to make it clear that, even if the transaction was not
considered to be a 'kickback' for which no service had been rendered,
payment nevertheless violated the Act." 6 7
Based on this broad reading of the Anti-Kickback Statute, the
Third Circuit held that the test to determine liability under the
Anti-Kickback Statute is: "If the payments were intended to induce
the physician to use Cardio-Med's services, the statute was violated,
even if the payments were also intended to compensate for
professional services." 68 Under this standard, a defendant is liable if
they make a payment and even "one purpose" of that payment is to
"induce future referrals." 69
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 71 (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 72.
Id.
Id. at 69.
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Courts throughout the country have followed the One Purpose
Test articulated in Greber.0 The Tenth Circuit noted this trend,
stating: "The only three Circuits to have decided this issue have all
adopted the 'one purpose' test."7 '

The court noted that its decision to

deny a challenge to the One Purpose Test was based on "review of, and
agreement with, the 'sound reasoning' of the Third Circuit in
Greber."72
In 1987, Congress amended the Anti-Kickback Statute,
directing HHS to develop regulatory safe harbors to immunize certain
socially beneficial business practices. 73 Business practices covered by
safe harbors are shielded from liability under the Anti-Kickback
Statute, despite potentially involving remuneration with some intent
to induce referrals. 74 Congress intended the amendment to provide
security to businesses by ensuring that their agreements do not make
them liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute.7 5
The

1987 Amendment

preserved the One Purpose Test.76

While socially beneficial conduct that falls within a statutory or
legislative "safe harbor" is immune from liability under the
Anti-Kickback Statute, courts still evaluate transactions that do not
meet the requirements of a specific safe harbor under the broad
standard laid out in Greber.7 7 The First Circuit held that Greber was
still good law after the passage of the 1987 Amendment, stating "[t]he
fact that Congress, in reenacting the substantive sections of the
Medicare Fraud statute did not change them, implies that Congress
approved prior interpretations such as Greber."7 8
II. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE CREATES A BARRIER TO ACHIEVING
THE GOALS OF THE HITECH ACT

The broad scope of the One Purpose Test has the potential to
create liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute for hospitals that
provide EHR technology or services to physicians.79 Anticipating this

70.
E.g., United States v. LaHue, 261 F.3d 993, 1003 (10th Cir. 2001).
71.
Id. (quoting United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Id.
72.
73.
See id.
74.
See id.
75.
See id.
See id.
76.
See id.
77.
78.
United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 31
(1st Cir. 1989).
79.
See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68, 69 (1985).
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issue, HHS created a safe harbor for EHRs.8 0 However, it is unclear
whether this safe harbor is enough to overcome the obstacles created
by the Anti-Kickback Statute.8 1
A. The One Purpose Test has the Potential to Implicate the Adoption of
Electronic Health Records
The broad scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute, as interpreted in
Greber, may be a barrier to the HITECH Act's goal of universal EHR
adoption. 82
The purpose of the Anti-Kickback Statute is "to prevent drains
on the public fisc." 83 However, "the statute does not require that there

be a drain on the public fisc in order for payments to be illegal." 84
Therefore, parties can be liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute even
if they pay fair market value for services that were actually performed
and would not cause the federal government to pay any additional
money in Medicare fees.85
This extends the reach of the
Anti-Kickback Statute beyond its primary purpose of preventing
drains on the public fisc and potentially creates liability for actions
that pose no risk of financial harm to the government.86
Parties can also be liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute even
if their actions cause no tangible harm to patients.8 7 If one purpose of
a hospital payment is to induce referrals, liability can exist under the
One Purpose Test even if there was no effect on the quality or cost of
the services provided.8 8 Therefore, the Anti-Kickback Statute, as
interpreted in Greber, is significantly broader than under traditional
fraud statutes that require the government to show that actual harm
occurred.89
Hospital physician recruitment agreements provide an example
of a relationship that has the potential to violate the Anti-Kickback
Statute, despite not creating a drain on the public fisc or causing

80.
42 C.F.R. § 1001 (2014).
Id.
81.
82.
Greber, 760 F.2d at 69.
83.
Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d at 32. Merriam-Webster defines fisc as "a state or
royal treasury." Definition Fisc, MERRIAM WEBSTER (2014), available at http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/fisc.
84.
Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d at 32 n.21.
85.
See id. at 31.
86.
See id. at 32 n.21.
87.
See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442-43 (8th Cir. 1996).
88.
See id.
89.
See id.

2015]

KICKBACKS AND CONTRADICTIONS

503

tangible harm to patients. 90 If a hospital offers a physician any
remuneration to join its staff, intending that the doctor will refer
Medicare patients to the hospital, it risks violating the One Purpose
Test.91 The District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held that a
hospital had violated the Anti-Kickback Statute by offering a
physician remuneration in the form of an interest-free loan, free office
space, and reimbursement for the expense of relocation and obtaining
malpractice insurance to induce the physician to move his practice to
the hospital. 92
Recruitment agreements, many of which offer guarantees of
income or payment of relocation expenses, are a standard tool used by
businesses to recruit top professionals. This practice does not fall into
the conventional definition of fraud and is not prosecutable under the
mail fraud statute or any other traditional fraud statute. 93 However,
due to the scope of the One Purpose Test, payments for recruitment of
health care professionals can be found fraudulent under the
Anti-Kickback Statute.9 4
Additionally, courts have invalidated physician recruitment
agreements, despite the fact that they have the potential to benefit the
community by increasing the quality of medical care available to
residents.9 5
Many hospitals in rural areas have a difficult time
attracting physicians and rely on recruitment incentives to ensure
that they can provide adequate medical care to their patients. The
Texas district court acknowledged this phenomenon, stating "the
hospital may well have been motivated to a greater or lesser degree by
a legitimate desire to make better medical services available in the
community."9 6 However, the court invalidated the contract because
one purpose of the agreement was to induce referrals to the hospital,
demonstrating that socially beneficial agreements can violate the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 97
The broad interpretation of the Anti-Kickback Statute
advanced by courts could frustrate the purpose of the HITECH Act to
incentivize physicians to computerize their medical records.
For
example, hospitals can use EHR technology as another tool to recruit

90.
See Polk Cnty., Tex. v. Peters, 800 F. Supp. 1451, 1456 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (internal
citations omitted).
91.
See id.
92.
Id. at 1455-56.
93.
See Jain, 93 F.3d at 441-42.
94.
See Peters, 800 F. Supp. at 1456.
95.
See id.
Id.
96.
97.
See id.
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physicians. 98
Hospitals can offer to provide EHR technology to
physicians or compensate physicians for the cost of adopting EHRs in
return for the physician agreeing to move his or her practice to the
hospital.9 9 Compensating physicians for the cost of adopting EHR
technology could be considered analogous to reimbursing physicians
for moving expenses, which has previously been found to violate the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 100
Given the financial pressure put on physicians by the HITECH
Act, many independent practitioners not currently affiliated with
hospitals will have a strong incentive to move their practices. 101 These
unaffiliated physicians may lack the capital necessary to pay the
upfront costs of computerizing their medical records and likely would
incorporate their practices with that of a local hospital in return for
the hospital providing the physicians with EHR technology. 102
Additionally, if hospitals do not provide their current staff physicians
with EHR technology, those physicians will have a strong incentive to
move their practices to other hospitals that will compensate them for
adopting EHRs.1 03
Despite the fact that the federal government identified the
adoption of EHRs as socially beneficial, providing EHR technology to
physicians creates a potential violation of the Anti-Kickback
Statute. 104 When hospitals recruit physicians, there is an expectation
that the physicians will refer their existing patients to the hospital. 0 5
If the hospital provides remuneration to the recruited physician, it can
be held liable under the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 06 The statute states
that remuneration can "be in cash or in kind."1 07 This definition of
remuneration would include providing EHR technology to physicians
even if the hospital's recruitment agreement did not require it to pay
any money to the physicians it recruited. 0 8
Therefore, hospitals
require legal protection in order to provide EHR technology to
physicians without violating the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 09

98.
See 42 C.F.R. § 1001 (2014).
See id.
99.
100.
See Peters, 800 F. Supp. at 1455-56.
101.
42 C.F.R. § 1001.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
See Peters, 800 F. Supp. at 1456.
105.
See id.
106.
See id.
107.
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93 § 14(a), 101 Stat. 680.
108.
See id.
109.
See id.
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B. The Government has Taken Steps to Limit Liability for Socially
Beneficial Agreements Including ElectronicHealth Records
Recognizing the need to protect hospitals when they provide
EHR technology to physicians, HHS created a safe harbor regulation
for EHRs. However, it is unclear whether the safe harbor is broad
enough to immunize the socially beneficial practice of adopting EHR
technology.
If an
Regulatory safe harbors are drawn narrowly.1 10
agreement does not meet the exact requirements of a safe harbor
regulation, it is not immunized from liability under the Anti-Kickback
Statute."1 ' HHS clarified that an agreement is subject to the One
Purpose Test if it does not fit precisely into a safe harbor, even if it is
in substantial compliance with the requirements of the regulation.112
Additionally, safe harbor regulations fail to immunize all
agreements that create no risk of tangible harm to patients or risk of
drain on the public fisc.11 3 HHS rejected a proposed safe harbor for
"business arrangements that technically may violate the statute, but
do not increase costs to the Medicare or Medicaid programs, or
otherwise injure beneficiaries."1 1 4 This demonstrates that even after
the promulgation of safe harbor regulations, the scope of the
Anti-Kickback Statute is still far broader than that of traditional
fraud statutes."15
Many arrangements will not fit into the narrow requirements
of a specific safe harbor, forcing the parties to rely on HHS's
prosecutorial discretion." 6 It is common for agreements in the health
care field to technically violate the Anti-Kickback Statute, but HHS
has no motivation to challenge these agreements if they create no risk
of tangible harm to patients or drain on the public fisc.11 However,
because the arrangements are not immunized from liability, the
parties cannot be certain that they will not be subject to felony
charges." 8

110.
See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG AntiKickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,954 (July 29, 1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
1001).
See id.
111.
See id.
112.
See id. at 35,954-55.
113.
Id.
114.
115.
See id.
Id.
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
118.
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The parties' uncertainty is furthered by the False Claims Act,
which allows a private party to bring a lawsuit alleging a violation of
the Anti-Kickback Statute on behalf of the United States.1 19 Private
parties, such as former hospital employees, often have access to the
information necessary to demonstrate technical violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 120 These private parties can bring suit, even if
HHS would have exercised prosecutorial discretion and chosen not to
pursue the case because the agreement in question created no risk of
harm to either patients or the federal government.121
In an effort to prevent the Anti-Kickback Statute from
interfering with the incentive structure created by the HITECH ACT,
HHS promulgated regulations creating an "Electronic Health Records
Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute." 122 HHS published the
final rule establishing the safe harbor in December 2013.123 The EHR
safe harbor allows hospitals to donate up to 85 percent of the cost of
purchasing, implementing, and maintaining EHR technology to
physicians. 124 This safe harbor will allow hospitals to use EHR
technology as a recruitment tool without violating the Anti-Kickback
Statute. 125 The safe harbor will also help to achieve the goals set forth
in the HITECH Act by allowing hospitals to donate costly EHR
technology to physicians who otherwise may not have had the capital
necessary to transition to EHRs. 126
The safe harbor had an initial sunset date of December 31,
2013.127 However, when HHS released the final rule, it extended the
safe harbor through 2021.128
The extension of the safe harbor
demonstrates that, while EHR technology use is expanding, the
medical community still needs additional time to achieve the
President's goal of computerizing all health records. 129
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C. The Safe Harborfor Electronic Health Records May Not Be Broad
Enough to Overcome the Barriers Created by the Anti-Kickback Statute
While the safe harbor will allow hospitals to significantly
defray the cost of adopting EHR technology, it will still leave
physicians responsible for funding at least 15 percent of the cost of
transitioning to EHRs. 130 While this represents only a small portion of
the total cost of purchasing EHR technology, it may still prove to be
too steep a price for independent practitioners who do not have the
resources of a hospital or a large group practice. 131
A recent study in the journal Health Affairs determined that
the average cost of implementing an EHR system was $162,000 for a
five-physician primary care practice in Texas. 132 The study also
estimated that the practice would pay an additional $85,000 in system
maintenance costs over the first year of implementation. 133 Moving
beyond the pure financial cost of implementing an EHR system, the
study estimated that each physician and their staff would need to
spend 134 hours preparing to use the EHR system in clinical
encounters.134
Based on the total cost of implementing an EHR system,
Health Affairs estimated that the process would cost each physician in
the group approximately $32,000.135 The journal noted that this
estimate was consistent with studies from Massachusetts and New
York which placed the per physician cost of adopting an EHR system
in the $34,000-39,000 range. 136
However, some studies project that the cost of implementing an
EHR system will be significantly higher than the estimate provided by
Health Affairs. 137 A study by CDW Healthcare estimated the total
cost of implementing an EHR system would be $120,000 per
physician. The study also projected annual recurring costs of $30,000
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per physician.13 8
High price estimates from health information
technology companies, such as CDW, could help explain why many
physicians have not yet adopted EHR technology. 139 If independent
physicians with limited capital believe that they will not be able to
afford EHR systems without assistance, they may choose to accept the
Medicare fee reduction imposed on physicians who do not demonstrate
meaningful use of EHRs. 140
Whether the safe harbor is broad enough to protect the
adoption of EHRs will depend on which cost estimates proves to be
correct. If lower cost estimates put forth by Health Affairs prove to be
accurate, the 85 percent cap will likely not be a significant barrier to
EHR adoption. 141 However, if the higher cost estimates put forth by
CDW Healthcare prove to be accurate, physicians could have difficulty
affording 15 percent of the cost of adopting EHR technology. 142
A national survey conducted by the New England Journal of
Medicine confirmed that costs were a significant reason why many
physicians have not yet adopted EHR technology. 143 "Capital costs"
and "uncertainty about their return on investment" were two of the
reasons most commonly cited as barriers to adoption by physicians
who did not have access to an EHR system. 144
This survey
demonstrates that, regardless of which cost estimate for the adoption
of EHR technology ultimately proves to be correct, physicians are
clearly concerned with the potential cost of purchasing and
maintaining EHR technology. 145
The Anti-Kickback Statute will also likely prevent hospitals
from loaning money to physicians in order to cover the portion of the
EHR technology that the physician is responsible for. 146 Courts have
held that a loan to a physician represents remuneration intended to
induce referrals, invalidating hospital recruitment agreements.14 7
Therefore, recruitment agreements that offer physicians loans to fund
the balance of their EHR implementation costs would likely also be
invalidated by the courts.1 48
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Additionally, hospitals will likely be concerned that providing
any additional help to physicians will represent a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 149 A hospital can only receive the protection of
the EHR safe harbor if its agreements with physicians meet the
narrow requirements of the safe harbor.1 50 If hospitals attempt to aid
physicians beyond donating up to 85 percent of the cost of purchasing,
implementing, and maintaining EHR technology, they will put
themselves at risk for felony charges and significant monetary
damages. 151
The 85 percent donation cap may have the effect of limiting the
number of the physicians that are financially able to adopt EHRs. 15 2
This would represent a failure of the safe harbor regulations to
immunize socially beneficial behavior. 153 EHR use is intended to
improve patient care by eliminating preventable medical errors. 154
However, if a significant portion of physicians cannot afford to
computerize their medical records, unnecessary medical errors will
continue to occur.15 5
Additionally, if the donation cap prevents physicians from
adopting EHRs, it will frustrate the purpose of the Anti-Kickback
Statute, which is designed "to prevent drains on the public fisc."156
Greater use of EHRs will make medical care more efficient, saving
money for federal health care programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid. 15 7 The donation cap could have the unintended consequence
of limiting the financial savings available to the federal government
through the HITECH Act. 15 8
III. A BROADER SAFE HARBOR WILL BETTER SERVE THE PURPOSES OF
THE HITECH ACT AND THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
In order to ensure the HITECH Act is successful and that the
President's goal of computerizing all health records in the United
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States is met, HHS should broaden the EHR safe harbor.15 9 The HHS
should promulgate new regulations that remove the 85 percent
donation cap and allow hospitals to donate the full cost of purchasing,
implementing, and maintaining EHR technology to physicians.1 60
This broader safe harbor regulation will remove the financial
impediments currently preventing some physicians from adopting
EHRs and encourage hospitals to take on a larger role in the process
of computerizing medical records in their communities. 16 1
A. A Broader Safe Harbor Will Reduce Impediments to the Adoption of
ElectronicHealth Records
HHS can eliminate physicians' concerns about the cost of
adopting EHR technology by allowing hospitals to donate the total cost
of purchasing, maintaining, and implementing EHR technology to
physicians.1 62 Hospitals can clearly afford EHR technology, as
demonstrated by the fact that over 80 percent of hospitals in the
United States have already adopted EHR technology.163
Hospitals will likely take advantage of the opportunity to
donate EHR technology to physicians if they are legally allowed to do
so.1 6 4 A hospital often offers physicians compensation in return for
moving their practices to the hospital.1 65
As physicians find
themselves under financial pressure to computerize their health
records, the ability to donate EHR technology to physicians will likely
become an important recruiting tool for hospitals.1 66
Additionally, a hospital is likely to see a financial benefit if the
physicians it works with have adopted EHR technology that is
interoperable with that of the hospital.' 6 7 The use of EHR technology
will increase the efficiency of hospitals by eliminating the need to
repeat costly tests and procedures. 6 8 Eliminating these unnecessary
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services will help hospitals to meet the cost saving requirements
included in the Affordable Care Act. 169
However, while hospitals have strong financial incentives to
donate EHR technology to physicians, they will be unlikely to do so if
they are concerned about exposure to liability under the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 170 Hospitals risk felony charges if their actions
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. 171 Even if HHS chooses not to
pursue a claim, hospitals are still liable to suits brought by private
individuals, such as disgruntled former employees, under the False
Claims Act. 172 Given this high danger of felony liability, hospitals are
likely to be extremely careful to avoid liability under the
Anti-Kickback Statute. 173 This caution may prevent hospitals from
donating EHR technology to physicians because they are concerned
that they will not meet the strict requirements of the safe harbor
regulation. 174
HHS could make it significantly easier for hospitals to comply
with the EHR safe harbor by eliminating the 85 percent donation
cap.175 If HHS made it clear that virtually all donations fit into the
EHR safe harbor, hospitals could legally donate the full cost of
purchasing, maintaining, and implementing EHR technology to
physicians.17 6 This would reduce the concern over liability under the
Anti-Kickback Statute and encourage a greater number of hospitals to
donate EHR technology to physicians in their communities. 7 7
Additionally, the current safe harbor regulation likely does not
allow hospitalsto donate the entire cost of purchasing EHR technology
to physicians.' 7 8 Courts have held that loans to physicians represent a
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 79 Therefore, a loan to a
physician to cover the full cost of EHR adoption likely creates liability
under the Anti-Kickback Statute. 8 0
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Eliminating the 85 percent donation cap would allow hospitals
to loan physicians money to cover the cost of adopting EHRs.1 81
Therefore, even if hospitals did not want to cover the entire cost of a
physician's transfer to EHR technology, the hospital could still provide
the initial capital investment. 182 This would help ease the concern
over capital costs identified in the New England Journal of Medicine
survey. 183
Some opponents of a broader safe harbor may argue that
physicians do not actually need a hospital to reimburse 100 percent of
their expenses in order to adopt EHR technology. HHS echoed this
view when explaining the rationale behind the 85 percent donation
cap, stating that requiring physicians to contribute 15 percent of the
cost of EHR adoption would not pose a significant financial burden. 184
If the Health Affairs' cost estimates are correct, computerizing their
medical records should not be unduly burdensome for physicians,
especially if hospitals can still cover 85 percent of their costs as
currently allowed under the safe harbor.18 5 However, the New
England Journal of Medicine survey indicates that whatever the
actual cost of adopting EHR technology, doctors have resisted
computerizing their medical records because they are concerned about
capital costs and return on investment. 18 6 Allowing hospitals to
completely cover the cost of EHR technology would remove this
concern and eliminate a major barrier to universal EHR adoption.
In explaining the rationale behind the 85 percent donation cap,
HHS also pointed out the importance of physicians having a financial
stake in the adoption of EHR technology.1 87 The agency reasoned that
if physicians were required to pay for a portion of their EHR
technology, they would have greater incentives to select technology
that was appropriate for their practice and would be more likely to
actually utilize the technology.1 8 8 Physician selection and utilization
of the appropriate EHR technology is necessary to achieve the
HITECH Act's goals of reducing the cost and improving the quality of
181.
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182.
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medical care. However, no progress will be made toward the goals of
the HITECH Act if physicians cannot afford to adopt EHR technology.
Therefore, while HHS has raised important concerns about physicians
having a financial stake in EHR adoption, those concerns are
outweighed by the cost constraints that have prevented many
physicians from computerizing their medical records.
B. A Broader Safe Harbor Will Furtherthe Purposeof the AntiKickback Statute More Effectively
New regulations that remove the 85 percent donation cap and
allow hospitals to donate to physicians the full cost of purchasing,
implementing, and maintaining EHR technology would further the
purpose of the Anti-Kickback Statute more effectively than the
current safe harbor regulations. 189 The Anti-Kickback Statute is
designed to save the federal government money and to prevent
unnecessary federal expenditures.1 90 EHR technology serves this goal
by reducing the number of expensive tests and procedures performed
by physicians and hospitals.1 9 1 The more efficient delivery of medical
care will save the federal government money because Medicare and
Medicaid will no longer be required to pay for unnecessary services.192
Therefore, widespread EHR adoption will reduce federal health care
spending. 193 When the President announced the goal of computerizing
all medical records in the United States, he touted these efficiency
savings, noting that EHR technology can reduce waste by eliminating
the need to repeat expensive medical tests and procedures. 194
Removing the 85 percent donation cap would cause more physicians to
adopt EHR technology, leading to additional savings for the federal
government. 195

Broader EHR safe harbor regulations would also further the
purpose of the 1987 Amendment to the Anti-Kickback Statute. 196 This
amendment, which gave HHS the authority to create regulatory safe
harbors, was designed to immunize socially beneficial behavior from
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liability under the Anti-Kickback Statute.1 97 EHR technology has the
ability to significantly reduce preventable medical errors, improving
patient outcomes.19 8 The President touted the socially beneficial
nature of EHR technology, noting its ability to save lives by
preventing unnecessary medical errors. 199 Saving lives by preventing
medical errors is clearly socially beneficial behavior of the type that is
supposed to be protected by safe harbors. 200 However, if the 85
percent donation cap prevents some physicians from computerizing
their medical records, the safe harbor will fail to stop preventable
deaths from occurring. 20 1 A broader regulation, which allows hospitals
to donate the full cost of EHR technology to physicians, would ensure
that the safe harbor functioned as effectively as possible, and that the
Anti-Kickback Statute did not impede progress toward improving the
quality of medical care in the United States. 202
Some opponents of a broader safe harbor may argue that
allowing hospitals to pay for the entire cost of EHR technology serves
as a kickback to physicians and encourages fraud. However, the
current safe harbor already allows hospitals to pay up to 85 percent of
a physician's EHR technology under the current safe harbor. 203 While
raising this cap to 100 percent may allow more physicians to adopt
EHR technology, it is unlikely that this increase would significantly
change their referral practices. Additionally, since EHR technology
stands to significantly reduce costs for the federal government and
improve patient care, it would not frustrate the purpose of the
Anti-Kickback Statute if physicians using EHR technology referred
patients to affiliated hospitals that also utilize EHR technology. 204
In explaining the rationale behind the 85 percent donation cap,
HHS also noted that requiring physicians to have a financial stake in
EHR adoption prevents them from receiving a windfall if they gain
financial benefits from computerizing their medical records. 205
Physicians may gain financial benefits from adopting EHR technology,
including reduced expenses and incentive payments under the
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HITECH Act. 2 0 6 If physicians are not required to pay any of the cost
of adopting EHR technology, these benefits could be viewed as a
kickback. 207 However, physicians will only receive these financial
benefits after they have computerized their medical records.
Therefore, while it may make sense to require physicians to reimburse
hospitals if they receive a windfall benefit after adopting EHR
technology, it does not make sense for HHS to leave the 85 percent
donation cap in place if it prevents physicians from making the initial
decision to adopt EHR technology.
While the United States has made great progress toward the
goal of computerizing all health records, universal adoption of EHR
technology will require further, significant gains. 20 8 These gains will
need to come largely from physicians, almost half of whom have yet to
purchase EHR technology. 209 The federal government created strong
incentives through the HITECH Act to encourage these physicians to
adopt EHR technology. 210 However, the federal government may also
have inadvertently created a barrier to the adoption of EHR
technology by allowing hospitals to donate only 85 percent of the cost
of purchasing, implementing, and maintaining EHR technology to
physicians. 211 If the government is to succeed in the monumental goal
of computerizing the entire nation's health records, the entire federal
government must encourage hospitals and physicians to adopt EHR
technology. 212 For this reason, HHS should broaden the EHR safe
harbor regulations, removing the 85 percent donation cap and
allowing hospitals to donate the full cost of purchasing, implementing,
and maintaining EHR technology to physicians. 213
IV. CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration chose to make universal adoption
of EHR technology a major policy priority. 2 14 The administration
dedicated significant resources to this goal, allocating a portion of its
stimulus package to create incentives for physicians and hospitals to
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computerize their medical records. 215 This effort has been largely
successful, as evidenced by the significant increase in medical
providers who have adopted EHR technology since the passage of the
HITECH Act. 2 16
However, for the President to achieve his goal of computerizing
all medical records in the United States, he will need to ensure that
other federal laws do not conflict with the incentive structure created
by the HITECH Act. 2 17 The Anti-Kickback Statute has the potential
to limit the effectiveness of the HITECH Act by prohibiting hospitals
from donating EHR technology to physicians. 218 While HHS has
created a safe harbor to address this issue, it is unclear whether the
safe harbor is broad enough to overcome the impediments created by
the Anti-Kickback Statute. 2 19 In order to ensure that the entire
federal regulatory scheme incentivizes the adoption of EHR
technology, HHS should broaden the safe harbor, allowing hospitals to
donate the full cost of purchasing, implementing, and maintaining
EHR technology to physicians. 2 20
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